framework that applies decision-making theory to historical case studies in order to distill generalizable analyses without sacrificing realistic complexity. Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) Theory is a useful tool to provide this type of analysis. Using a twostage decision-making process, the theory provides a capacity for detail coupled with outcome validity as well as the ability to address what otherwise appears to be irrational behavior on the part of third parties. Poliheuristic Decision Theory's fundamental assertion of a two-stage decision-making process operates as follows: in the first stage, alternatives are eliminated from the choice set based on noncompensatory risk presented to the political dimension (Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz 2002) . The second stage of the decision-making process then attempts to bridge the divide between rational choice and cognitive schools by allowing the decisionmaker to go through an analytic process of choosing an option that minimizes risk and guarantees rewards (Mintz 2002) .
In relation to the study of third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is achieved most effectively through a qualitative case study, not least because a traditional quantitative study of multiple nation states' involvement is unlikely to provide the detail necessary to understand this type of decision-making in the early stages of its study. While it is possible to use Poliheuristic Decision Theory in large-N studies (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; Brulé and Mintz 2006) , the nature of shifting and routine third party roles is more problematic to classify than crisis behavior. In addition, a qualitative approach utilizing Ph theory then also allows for an explanation for third party behavior that defies rationality -as defined by the rational choice model as purposive action seeking utility maximization (MacDonald 2003; Allison 1971) . Crucially, the Ph approach provides a different but still widely generalizable understanding of rationality, one based primarily on the logic of political survival and the non-compensatory principle (Mintz 2004) . As this principle is excluded from both rational choice and the cybernetic model favored by cognitive theorists (Brulé 2008, 267) , Ph theory provides a fundamental reframing of investigations into third party intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, from a focus on external to internal variables, the link between domestic political concerns and foreign policy decision-making and providing a rational explanation for otherwise irrational choices. In applying Ph theory's two-stage decision-making framework to Britain's national home policy, it is possible to demonstrate why the cabinet decided to affirm the policy in 1922 and how this very early example of third party intervention in the conflict was concluded entirely without reference to the interests of either community in Palestine. This paper argues that in the first stage of the decision-making process, the British cabinet rejected alternatives that scored too low on the most important, political dimension. Key variables considered reflect criteria outlined by Mintz (2004) : threat to dignity, post-war economic decline and inter-party rivalry. Once options were eliminated, the cabinet chose among the remaining alternatives in the second stage of decision-making by seeking to minimize costs on the substantive, strategic dimension. This analysis reveals a third party intervention in the burgeoning Arab-Israeli conflict based primarily on the need to satisfy British domestic political concerns. It concludes that Ph theory provides a cogent explanation and post-diction of this decision as well as the ability to generalize to later and more culturally and politically diverse case studies, making it a highly useful theory of decision-making to assess third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Poliheuristic Decision Theory
The link between domestic and international politics is methodologically elusive. Although Foreign Policy Analysis (F.P.A.) is a subfield within international relations that focuses on human actors to demonstrate the decision-making processes behind foreign policy, the integration of the domestic into the international has remained a challenge. Within F.P.A., the debate has emerged from a divergence of theoretical perspectives. The two leading paradigms are the rational choice/expected utility model, originally the product of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940s, and a second based on the cybernetic perspective established by Herbert Simon (1959 Simon ( , 1985 and refined by John Steinbruner (1974) (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991) . Broadly defined, rational choice models apply cost-benefit analyses to the study of international politics (Mintz and Geva 1997) . The simplicity of rational choice creates highly effective predictive models, but they lack a descriptive quality that reflects reality and neglect the role of intricate combinations of variables such as domestic politics. This poses not only etymological problems, but it cannot explain instances when a decision-maker fails to choose the option with the most preferred consequence, or rather it cannot systematize the constraints that lead to suboptimal decision-making (Mintz and DeRouen 2010) . Such irrational decision-making is not inexplicable, however, it is merely outside of the scope provided by expected utility. This is why rational choice has been challenged by the cognitive approach, which instead focuses on the complex variables that impact decision-making such as personality and culture (Geertz 1973; Mintz 1997; Hermann 2003) . However, this second approach champions the minute intricacies of human behaviour at the expense of useful generalizability, so it too is incapable of providing the methodological link between domestic and international politics (Jones 1994; Stein and Welch 1997) .
These ostensibly rival models highlight different aspects of decision-making and possess various strengths and weaknesses. In an attempt to bridge the divide between them and attain both the descriptive accuracy of cognitivists, necessary to evaluate domestic politics, and the predictive success of rational choice models, crucial for applicability in the international environment, Poliheuristic Decision Theory utilizes both paradigms in a two-stage decision-making process (Mintz 1997) .
Whereas the second stage is governed by a relatively simple rational choice model discussed more below, the first stage is based on a cognitivist approach and is determined by five key characteristics: decision-making is nonholistic, dimensionbased, noncompensatory, satisficing and order-sensitive (Mintz and Geva 1997) .
First, the nonholistic or nonexhaustive nature of decision-making differentiates the poliheuristic approach from other F.P.A. models based on utility, which demand that a decision-maker conducts an exhaustive search of alternatives in order to compare costs versus benefits between them (Mintz and Geva 1997) . Instead, Ph theory assumes the decision-maker "adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria" (Mintz and Geva 1997, 85) . This nonholistic approach means that the choice set is defined by a dimension-based rather than an alternative-based search; decision-makers compare alternatives to a cluster of variables within the same organizing theme rather than assessing alternatives in a vacuum (Ostrom et al. 1980) . For example, the political dimension might include elements such as public opinion polls, the leader's popularity, the state of the economy and domestic opposition -variables used to evaluate the consequences of a chosen alternative on the political dimension. As the search is nonholistic, how many criteria and variables are used for any dimension is likely to vary as the decision-maker considers different alternatives along each organizing theme (Mintz and Geva 1997) . This means that any alternative that fails to meet a certain threshold on the most important dimension will be discarded (Mintz 1993 ).
Assuming political actors operate under self-interested motivations, politicians see gains and losses in political terms; the most important dimension, therefore, is the political dimension (DeRouen 2002). How a leader perceives the political consequences of his or her actions plays a crucial role in the decision-making process (Mintz 2004) . Loss-aversion overrules all other considerations, and so decisionmaking is driven by the desire to avoid failure rather than to achieve success (Anderson 1983) . Consequently, "a low score in the political dimension cannot be compensated for by a high score in some other dimensions" (Mintz and Geva 1997, 84) . This is the noncompensatory principle, and this loss-aversion variable can be operationalized in several ways:
Threat to a leader's survival; Significant drop in public support for a policy; Significant drop in popularity; The prospects of an electoral defeat; Domestic opposition; Threat to regime survival; Inter-party rivalry and competition;
Internal or external challenge to the regime; Potential collapse of the coalition government or regime; Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader; Demonstrations, riots, and so forth; The existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government (Mintz 2004, 9) . Consequently, this model represents a process in which alternatives are selected or rejected based on a satisficing rather than maximizing rule. The poliheuristic approach seeks acceptable options rather than maximizing alternatives because it is likely that some dimensions will remain unconsidered even after a decision is made (Mintz and Geva 1997, 87) . Rejecting the invariance assumption that "two alternative formulations of the same problem should yield the same choice" (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 727) , this stage also considers that the order in which variables are considered may impact the elimination of options from the choice set (Mintz and Geva 1997) .
After options are eliminated in the first stage, a second stage based on a costbenefit analysis selects a final alternative that becomes the choice. Although DeRouen and Sprecher (2002; 2004) argue that the second stage utilizes either E.B.A. or LEX.
Processes, the Poliheuristic model does not specify the conditions under which either strategy is selected (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2002, 32) . Cognitive psychology suggests this depends on the structural complexity of remaining choices (Hansen and Helgeson 1996; Payne, Bettman and Luce 1996; Payne 1976 ), but the selection of E.B.A. or LEX. creates a further problem. E.B.A. is simply "a sequential elimination decision heuristic" (DeRouen 2002, 16) , and the LEX. decision rule involves the selection of an alternative that provides the greatest utility for the most important substantive dimension (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988) . Both of these rules undermine the premise of rationality as defined by the rational choice model (MacDonald 2003; Allison 1971 ) and so contravene the original ethos of a poliheuristic theory as bridge-builder between cognitive and rational approaches. The difference is negligible to outcome validity -as the key assumption in stage two is that a decision-maker seeks to minimize costs and maximize rewards (Mintz 2002) - but this remains an unclear procedural element in the theory.
These characteristics form the cognitivist foundation of Ph theory's first stage and the rational choice basis for stage two. Options are eliminated from the choice set that do not meet requirements on the political dimension, and then the remaining alternatives are assessed with a cost-benefit analysis. Determining the cut off point, however, is one crucial element of Ph application that is potentially problematic.
Mintz and Geva developed a decision board (Mintz and Geva 1997) in which numerical values are assigned to variables within the political dimension, but this process involves the same level of educated estimation required in any purely qualitative analysis. Assigning numerical values on a decision board allows for clarification in research design, but it does not solve the underlying problem of context specificity and the dangers of selection bias. Politicians' levels of sensitivity to the political dimension, which variables are included in the political dimension, and the other dimensions under consideration are unique to each case study and demand a certain amount of specialist knowledge. This poses no fundamental obstacle to the successful application of Ph theory to either historical case studies or contemporary analyses, but it should be recognized that the theory cannot be applied without a certain amount of prerequisite research needed to appreciate the domestic political environment under consideration. Just as the widely accepted rational choice model ranks preferences according to expected utility, the first stage of Ph theory essentially if not methodologically ranks options according to their expected utility on the variables of the political dimension. Rather than selecting a winning option, however, this process simply eliminates the losers. As this case study deals with a cabinet rather than a presidential system, however, the exact process of eliminating options in a group setting is somewhat elusive. Although Redd has addressed case studies in which a single decision-maker is influenced by bureaucratic advice 2005; Christensen and Redd 2004) , this is not the same as group decision-making. Conversely, Brummer directly applies Ph theory to the bureaucratic politics model, but rather than integrating bureaucratic politics into the poliheuristic theory, Brummer utilizes Ph to facilitate bureaucratic politics' process validity. Having specifically chosen a case study in which party politics was unlikely to play a role due to a large government majority, Brummer replaces the noncompensatory loss aversion variable with a "noncompensatory organizational loss aversion variable" in which the key dimension is not domestic politics but organizational interests (Brummer 2012, 2-6) . While useful to Bureaucratic Politics, this approach must assume the existence of multiple causal paths and so it sacrifices the predictable outcome validity needed to maintain the central function of Ph theory. Instead, the best argument for group decision-making within a poliheuristic approach can be found in Brulé (2008) . Brulé argues that decisions made in group settings can be addressed "as an n-actor, m-dimensional bargaining scenario in which preferences are aggregated according to the two-stage process Poliheuristic theory describes" (Brulé 2008, 283) . This is based on the assumption that all members of the group possess "an effective veto on any decision," so "the aggregation of group preferences into a single choice would, in the first stage, involve the elimination of all alternatives that are noncompensatory to any member of the group" (Brulé 2008, 283) . Rather than every member of the British cabinet possessing an effective veto, however, this case study assumes a narrowing of the Haycraft. The report concluded that "the fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration" (Cmd 1540). Politically, the main fear was "that the Jews when they had sufficiently increased in numbers would become so highly organized and so well armed as to be able to overcome the Arabs, and rule over and oppress them" (Cmd 1540). Economically, the influx of skilled Jewish laborers and artisans was seen as a threat to Arab livelihoods (Cmd 1540).
In light of the tensions highlighted by these commission reports, the cabinet in According to the poliheuristic theory, the first stage of decision-making is presumed to be based on political survival rather than a complete assessment of costs and benefits (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 61) . A decision-maker is first concerned with the political implications of a decision, so variables like public opinion, the economy and domestic opposition "may be used to evaluate the consequence of a chosen alternative on this organizing theme" (Mintz 1993, 600) . Using the list of variables to be considered as part of the political dimension provided by Mintz (2004) , this section demonstrates how the noncompensatory loss aversion variable was operationalized in British decision-making regarding Palestine through threat to dignity, post-war economic decline and inter-party rivalry; options were eliminated from the choice set by discarding those that failed to meet requirements on the political dimension.
Variable: Threat to Dignity (C Head)
The threat to dignity is one of the variables outlined by Mintz (2004) 
Variable: The Economy (C Head)
The economy may seem more like a substantive dimension in the second stage of decision-making, but in times of hardship it can serve as a variable on the political dimension. This is because the variable under consideration, though ostensibly dealing with issues related to the economy, is really concerned with strategic political manipulation of perceptions of the economy, and as such, it requires consideration on the political dimension. The post-war coalition under Liberal British Prime Minister David Lloyd George was faced with the major task of reconstruction in a harsh economic climate. As a prolonged economic crisis hit Britain by 1920-21, the entire government was under pressure to spend less abroad and more at home. One of the most expensive elements of Britain's empire was the troop numbers needed to maintain it. This meant that post-war economic decline removed an option from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making. Imposing the national home policy with the threat or use of force -i.e. the stationing of troops sufficient in number to protect a very small Jewish minority from the Arab majority -was far too damaging to the political dimension.
The severe contraction of markets during the war (including the loss of Britain's largest trading partner, Germany) meant Britain slid quickly into its first globalized economic crisis. An industrial recession struck in May 1920, and Britain was facing a high unemployment problem by the end of the year. More than two million were out of work in December 1921, and the average unemployment rate stayed over 10% for several years, higher than anything recorded before the war (Constantine 1984, 89) . These economic problems also brought large-scale industrial action. A "triple alliance" of workers from the mining, railway and transport industries provided continual unrest (Amery 1953, 205) . As well as the demonstrations, marches and occasional violence of British workers, the government was also trying to deal with complaints from big business and institutions like the Bank of England, all clamoring for cuts (Constantine 1984, 90) entitled 'situation in Palestine"; it said Palestine was in "increasing danger" that would require "heavy expenditure" and meet "bitter resentment" from Zionists "for not protecting them better" (CAB 24/125, June 9, 1921) . "I do not think," Congreve concluded, things are going to get better in this part of the world, but rather worse" (CAB 24/125, June 9, 1921) . Churchill circulated this memo to the cabinet, but only to highlight how he disagreed with it. This was one month after the Jaffa riots, but neither the unrest nor advice from local officials appeared in policy discussions on cuts (CAB 24/131).
As War and then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill's singular drive to reduce spending reflected the political situation faced by the entire coalition cabinet.
The expense associated with troops meant Palestine could not receive the necessary reinforcements needed to protect the Zionist experiment from violence. In a time of widespread industrial action, high unemployment and general economic downturn, the political cost was too high and this option was removed from the choice set. In this sense, the economy variable was closely connected to the variable of inter-party politics, which is discussed below.
Variable: Inter-party Politics (C Head)
One of the most important aspects of Britain's early Palestine policy was the relationship with inter-party politics. This section argues that criticisms coming mainly from the Conservative Party led to an option being eliminated from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making. The "coupon" election of December 1918 left the Liberal David Lloyd George Prime Minister at the head of a majority Conservative coalition. Dissension with his leadership grew steadily, and virulent Parliamentary criticism of the government's Palestine policy meant the coalition was unable to continue the national home as it stood in the Balfour Declaration and draft mandate (which included a commitment to put it into effect) (Cmd 1785).
As the post-war political climate was marked by a significant swing to the right -the main issues of the 1918 election were the fate of Germany and the Kaiser, with many calling for his trial and execution along with the expulsion of Germans from Britain -the atmosphere among the electorate favored a Conservative victory (Wilson 1964, 40-41) . This climate placed a great deal of right-wing pressure on Lloyd George at the head of his coalition cabinet. , , Col. 2030 HLD June 8, 1921, Col. 470-9; CS June 14, 1921, Col. 265-334; HLD June 15, 1921, Col. 559-73) .
Colonial Secretary Churchill assured that " [w] hile the situation still fills us with a certain amount of anxiety […] I believe it is one that we shall be able to shape […] within the limits of the expense I have mentioned" (CS June 14, 1921, Col. 265-334) .
Later that month, however, he advised the cabinet to withdraw from Palestine (Makovsky 2007, 103) . This was because the Liberal Churchill and the rest of the coalition were feeling a great deal of pressure on the Palestine issue. The criticisms they faced were potent because they reflected political issues masquerading as substantive concerns, and these fell largely under the Conservative banner of "AntiWaste".
The coalition cabinet tried to downplay inter-party differences, so many policy debates raged in the press instead (O 'Morgan 1979, 169 ). An overwhelming majority of the 1918-enfranchised population (79.1%) had never voted before and were clamouring for information about politics -enhancing the role of newspapers, especially with regard to foreign affairs, for which the press was one of very few public sources of information (Kinnear 1973, 21-22) . Consequently, the press outlets that were highly critical of the Lloyd George government were also quite powerful.
This was demonstrated by the Anti-Waste League, a campaign led by Conservative peer and press baron Lord Rothermere, and championed in the House by his son, the M.P. Esmond Harmsworth. Using an axe as its symbol to represent spending-cuts, it was credited with winning two by-elections in Conservative seats (Kinnear 1973, 24) .
One sign that Lloyd George felt under pressure from this movement was the formation of The Committee on National Expenditure under the chairmanship of Conservative politician and businessman, Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, which, as expected, called for major spending reductions across most departments (Cmd 1581; 1582; 1589). Rothermere's brother, Lord Northcliffe, was also using his papers The Times, the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror to criticize Palestine based on its cost, as well as the idea that handing Muslim holy sites to Jews would inflame India.
Northcliffe's death in 1922 meant these papers passed to Rothermere, and they too became direct proponents of Anti-Waste.
In the same period, previously supportive Lord Beaverbrook also abandoned Lloyd George and used his Daily Express and Sunday Express to propagate the myth of a Jewish conspiracy; also included in this press revolt were The Spectator and the Answering allegations that the national home would inflame Indian religious sensibilities, the white paper also highlighted how "the present administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem Religious endowments" (Cmd 1700). Lord Islington had declared in June that the national home policy could not continue unaltered, and he was correct. Under the pressure of inter-party politics played out in Parliament and in the press, the coalition had been forced to eliminate the option of continuing with a policy of total support for the Balfour Declaration.
Stage Two
After the first stage of decision-making eliminated all options from the choice set that failed to meet requirements on the political dimension, only one alternative remained. In this case study, the British cabinet could neither entirely support nor repudiate the national home, leaving the single option of continuing, but imposing limitations designed to address its substantive weaknesses and political critics.
Although the noncompensatory decision-making process does not always continue until only one alternative is left, it is possible that all but one option are eliminated due to their prohibitively high costs on the political dimension (Mintz 1993, 600 ). On a procedural note, like DeRouen and Sprecher's proposed use of E.B.A. or LEX.
decision rules in the second stage, the existence of a sole remaining option undermines the original ethos of Ph theory to some extent. Although intended to bridge between cognitive and rational schools, it struggles to achieve this aim when the second stage of decision-making is denied a cost-benefit analysis between alternatives. Again, this does not impact outcome validity, but it does demonstrate an area where further procedural clarification would be beneficial.
The above analysis of stage one in the decision-making process reveals how only a solitary option remained after those that failed to meet domestic political requirements were eliminated. The British cabinet had no other alternative but to continue with the national home policy by imposing limitations on it. As the poliheuristic approach seeks acceptable options, any single remaining alternative is compared "to predetermined values along a selected set of dimensions" (Mintz and Geva 1997, 87) . In the case of post-war Palestine, one dimension emerged as substantive for decision-makers. Rather than seeking to maximize in this case, the remaining alternative was found to satisfice (Steinbruner 1974; Ostrom and Job 1986; Lui 2002 ) the sole substantive dimension, which was the military, or strategic dimension.
The Military Dimension (C Head)
In the context of the Jewish national home, the only dimension decision- 
Conclusion
The role of third parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict remains an important field of study, and assessing these roles does require an understanding of how policy towards the conflict is formulated. British involvement before 1948, and so prior to what many scholarly works adopt as a useful point of commencement, does not negate its importance. Broad, sweeping British policy during the mandate formed the earliest intervention between Palestine's two communities, and the wealth of research material available from this era provides an eerie realization of continuity in tensions and violence in the decades that followed. The Churchill White Paper 1922 reflected a British decision to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine but with restrictions designed to satisfy domestic critics, principally demanding the linkage of Jewish immigration to Palestine's economic capacity. The above study demonstrates a concerted effort to alter the flawed policy. This means the final decision cannot be attributed to simpler heuristics like path dependencies. Neither wholehearted support for, nor renunciation of, the British-Zionist relationship were viable options because fundamentally, they fell outside domestic political constraints. Although the white paper was framed as a remedy to tensions in Palestine, therefore, it took no consideration of either community during the decision-making process.
In the first stage, the cabinet rejected alternatives that failed to meet requirements on the most important, political dimension. Taking threat to international or diplomatic dignity into account meant the option to repudiate the national home was eliminated. The political backlash over the post-war economy meant the option to impose the national home with the threat or use of force also failed to meet requirements on the political dimension and was eliminated. Finally, inter-party rivalry left the cabinet unable to continue the national home as it stood in the Balfour Declaration and draft mandate. Consequently, the first stage of the decision-making process left only one alternative in the choice set. This option was then compared to the single substantive dimension to ensure it would not incur costs.
The option to continue with the national home with key limitations designed to satisfy domestic critics was found to be acceptable on the military/strategic dimension, allowing it to become the final choice.
By applying Ph theory to a single British case study, the poliheuristic approach allows an appreciation of this early third party role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but crucially, it demonstrates a coherent application of the decision-making theory for assessing the role of third parties throughout its timeline. Although the Ph approach must involve some degree of specialist knowledge in order to determine the key domestic political variables at play in any particular case study, as well as the cutoff point at which options become unacceptable on the political dimension, this is a process of merely whittling down Mintz' relatively comprehensive list (2004) and applying an argument to evidence. Rather than negating the applicability of Poliheuristic Decision Theory, this element of the theory champions a more realistic post-Cold War analysis. When bipolarity shared with a mysterious other determined the course of international politics, a model based solely on basic expected utility was appropriate. Even so, it is still possible for one analyst to disagree with another's predictive rankings, and so the Ph approach poses no methodological problems not already inherent in accepted F.P.A. models.
However, as the original ethos of Ph theory was to bridge the divide between cognitive and rational approaches, the above study notes two procedural flaws that undermine this aim. DeRouen and Sprecher's use of E.B.A. or LEX. decision rules in the second stage and the possibility of only a single option remaining after the first stage mean the theory can struggle to achieve its broader aim. This does not, however, pose a critical dilemma for using Poliheuristic Decision Theory as a means to understand third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In such explorative, archivebased qualitative case studies, the introduction of the political dimension as initial determinant of final choice remains the fundamentally important point.
In the twenty-first century, the opening of archives, the accessibility of decision-makers and open source material more generally does provide a unique opportunity to blend the cognitivist approach with rational choice in order to provide generalizable models. The specific variables on the political dimension will inevitably change between time periods and decision-makers under consideration -the media and opinion polls may be less important than discontent within the military, tribal alliances or foreign infiltration for example. Regardless of these shifting parameters or indeed the theory's minor procedural flaws, a Ph approach remains applicable because there is always a domestic political dimension that must be satisficed in order for leaders and governments to make decisions. Rather than attempting to provide a panacea decision-making model equally relevant to the laboratory as the world stage, Ph theory is specific to the political environment. Understanding foreign policy decision-making within this methodology is constrained only by the amount of information available to make value judgments regarding variables on the political dimension. It alters the fundamental starting point of analyzing state behavior, from questioning what leaders want, to asking what they wish to avoid. In democracies as well as dictatorships, the common theme remains political survival, making the Ph framework a highly useful tool in the study of policy decision-making. Therefore, just as Ph theory provides a cogent explanation and post-diction of the British decision in 1922 to affirm the policy of the Jewish national home, it possesses the scope needed to address later and culturally and politically diverse case studies, making it a highly useful methodology to assess third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
